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1. Introduction 
The classical Marxist congruenae between 
political and eaonomic power was to be 
disrupted by the distortions introduaed 
during the decolonisation proaess. 1 
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In recent years a great deal of attention has been given to the 
exploitative character of the political and economic relations 
between the rich industrial ('developed') countries and the poor 
agrarian ('underdeveloped' or 'developing') countries, as 
interconnected parts of the global capitalist 'system'. The global 
network of capitalist relations or system has been called 
'imperialism' and the parts or components of this whole have been 
named centers and peripheries or metropoles and satellites. 2 The 
thrust of the argument in. these analyses has been to demonstrate 
that 'underdevelopment' (persistent poverty) is caused by mechanisms 
of surplus-extraction and unequal distribution of spin-off effects 
of productive activities inherent in the global network of capitalist 
relations of production, for which the term 'imperialism' is used as 
a short-hand expression. These theories of imperialism try to demonstrate 
that the foreign policies of metropolitan states such as the United 
states or the EEe countries are necessarily expansionist and counter-
revolutionary; that the imperialist 'stage' in the development of 
capitalism produces stagnation and impoverishment of peripheral 
capitalist countries ('the development of underdevelopmerit' in 
Frank's expression) and that 'real' development will only become 
possible after most of the links which connect peripheral countries 
with the imperialist system will be broken, foliowing an internal 
transformation of their social and political struct~res ('social 
revolution'). 
Though these theories posit interconnections between international 
and international development processes, they in fact tend to present 
a uniform image of imperialist domination and dependence: the global 
'system' is analysed in its past performance and present structure, 
but about the specific interconnections between global and domestic 
processes in the development of particular societies these theories 
have little to say. 3 Yet, if the misdirected development within 
imperialism is to be changed, an internal social revolution is 
posited as necessary. 4 But the prospects for such revolutions cannot 
be derived from the theories of imperialism: according to familiar 
precepts of social analysis, whether Marxian or not, one has to 
analyse class formation processes in each country in relation with 
the development of the structure of the state (f.e. the strength and 
legitimacy of the governing class(es); its potential for repression; 
the effectiveness of government and bureaucracy etc.) For that reason 
increasing attention is now being given to the analysis of class 
formation processes in postcolonial societies. 5 But class analysis 
appears to be quite difficult in these societies, firstly because 
'competing affiliations (such as ethnic, caste or reiigiQus loyalties) 
are more manifest determinants of an individual social role' 6, and 
secondly, because it is complicated by the international dimension 
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of class formation, to which terms such as 'comprador bourgeoisie' 
or 'intendant class' (Cohen's concept, which includes indigenous 
managers of mUltinational corporations and state functionaries) 
testify. Because state formation, and especially the position of 
the military, is correctly seen to be in the nexus of international 
and domestic development, there is also increasing concern with the 
analysis of 'the post colonial state' and its relation to class 
formation processes. 7 
However, if one reads the literature it becomes quite clear 
that it is pervaded by considerable conceptual and therefore 
theoretical confusion. Sirice'the available terms, whether in Marxian 
or in mainstream social science analysis, are insufficient to 
conceptualise class formation processes in post-colonial societies 
new terms are continually being introduced, on the basis of ad-hoc 
criteria and without relating them clearly to a theoretical framework. 
This is also the case with respect to state ,formation processes~ the 
Ma~xian theory is admitted to be inadequate, whereas political science 
cannot help out, since there the state is taken for granted - in the 
sense that there is no concern with processes of state formation. 
In this paper I will attempt to conceptualise more adequately 
the interconnections between processes of state and class formation. 
I will first examine the Marxian concept of class and the Marxian 
theory of the state, and attempt to demonstrate in which respects and 
why Marxian conceptualisation and ,theory is inadequate. The alternative 
I will develop is based on Norbert Elias' theory of state formation 
processes. 
2. The Marxian Concept of Class 
The concept of class as used by Marx in his famous unfinished chapter 
of Capital, is defined in terms of mode and means of production. 8 
The capitalist mode of production tends to the development of two 
main classes in society, consisting of those who control the means 
of production and those who do not and are therefpre forced to sel1 
their labour-power' on the market as any other commodity. In the early 
stages of capitalist development landowners are still one of the 
'three big classes of modern society based on the capitalist mode of 
production', but as all labour is increasingly transformed into wage-
labour and all the means of production into capital ('a continual 
tendency and law of development of the capitalist mode of production') 
the more capitalism develops, the more a two-class society will come 
into existence. Implied in Marx' conception is that the more this 
polarisation of capitalist society advances, the more the conditions 
for its transformation into a socialist society will come into being, 
i.e. will lead to increasing class-consciousness and organisation of 
the proletariat and to increasing competition within the capitalist 
class. Out of classes in itself ('an sich') classes for itself 
('fur sich') will emerge. 9 But since remnants of pre-capitalist modes 
of production will probably not disappear before capitalism itself, 
real capitalist societies will never completely correspond to the 
theoretical model of the capitalist mode of production. 10 
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In Marxian theory class is therefore a concept that refers to a 
relationship in process: it can be used to better understand the 
structure of development processes. The usefulness of such a concept 
of class can be demonstrated by studies such as E.P. Thompson's 
~he Making of the English Working Class' (1968). As Thompson says in 
his introduction: 'I do not see class as a 'structure', nor even as 
a category', but as something which in fact happens (and can be shown 
to have happened) in human relationships ••••• the notion of class 
entaiis the notion of historical relationship. Like arty other 
relationship it is a fluency which evades analysis if we attempt to 
stop it dead at any given moment and anatomise its structure. The finest-
meshed sociological net cannot give us a pure specimen of class ••••• ' 
What Thompson attempts to say is that class is a concept that expresses 
a particular kind of changing interdependence between human beings, 
rather than particular sets of attributes of human aggregates 
arranged on some:kind of high-middle-low scale, as in short-term 
stratification analysis. 11 Interdependence does not imply equal 
dependence: the point of Marxian class analysis is precisely that 
social classes have opposing interests, because control over the 
means of production enables the capitalist (and forces him because 
of the relentless competition in which he is engaged) to exploit the 
w~rkers by appropriating surplus-value. Why is he able to do this? 
Why are workers more dependent upon capitalists than vice versa? 
As far as I can see this question is not explicitly discussed in 
Marxist writings, probably because the answer is regarded as self-
evident. I have, however, found an answer that Marx himself has given. 'The 
great beauty of capitalist production is, that it riot- only reproduces 
wage labourers as wage labourers, but that it produces in relation 
to the accumulation of capital continuously a relative overpopulation 
of wage labourers'. 12 Marx added that this relative overpopulation 
assures the 'necessary social dependence of workers upon capitalists' 
which is an 'absolute dependence relation'. 13 The quotation is from 
the last chapter of Capital I, 'The modern theory of colonisation', 
in which Marx himself demonstrates not the absolute but indeed the 
relative nature of this dependence relation. He discusses a book by 
E.G. Wakefield about the relationship between England and America 
when America was still a colony of England. Wakefield pleads for 
'systematic colonisation' by which he means, as Marx shows, a policy 
of deliberate 'fabrication of wage workers'. Why was such a deliberate 
policy necessary? Why could this not be left to the development of 
market forces, as in England? Wakefield describes the adventures of 
a Mr. Peel, who did not only bring 50.000 pounds worth of means of 
production with him to America, but also his workers ('3000 people 
from the working class, man, wives and children'). But upon arrival 
in America 'Mr. Peel did not even have a servant to make his bed 
anymore ••••• '. The workers disappeared because they could easily 
acquire land for themselves or establish themselves an independent 
craftsman. Mr. Peel thus learned the lesson that 'capital is not a 
thing, but a social relationship between people mediated by things!. 
The term 'mediated' ('vermittelt') is here not yet the stop-gap, 
nearly metaphysical concept linking 'basis' and 'superstructure', that 
it has become in later Marxist writings: it simply means that to 
control 'things' (means of production) is a power resource in the 
English social context but not yet in the American context. In America 
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land had not yet been sufficiently exp~opriated from the mass of 
the people. Therefore the 'relative ove~population' of wage labourers 
which explains tho assymetry of inter~dependence between capitalists 
and workers did not exist to the same degree. The 4egree of 
exploitation of wage workers remains low, the workers lose their 
'feelings of dependence' and disappear from the labour market. 
Therefore a dependence relation has to be 'artificially created', 
i.e. by colonial (state) policy. But if degrees of dependence and 
exploitation vary with the degree of 'overpopulation' and with 
state policy (and in later phases with the degree of political 
organisation of the working class), does it then not also follow 
that it is necessary to speak of degrees of opposition of interests 
between social classes? But the recognition of that fact would make 
the notion of class struggle as necessarily leading to social (or 
'system') transformation questionable. 14 
To see class as a particular kind of interdependence (in 
process) between human beings leads to yet another question: is it 
indeed the case, a? it still is asserted in Marxian analysis, though 
with varying degrees of recognition of its problematic character, 
that this kind of 'economic' interdependence is the basic social 
relationship, that1conditions (if not determines) all other relations 
between human beings? In Ralph Miliband's attempt to update the 
Marxian theory of the state this is simply assumed: 'The economic and 
political life of bapitalist societies is p~imarily determined by 
the relationship, ~orn (?, vdB) of the capitalist mode of production, 
between these two classes - the class which on the one hand owns and 
controls, and the working class on the other. Here are still the 
social forces whose confrontation most powerfully shapes the social 
climate and politi9al system of advanced capitalism. In fact, the 
political process in these societies is mainly about the confrontation 
of these forces, and is intended (by whom, vdB) to sanction the terms 
of the relationship between them'. 15 But can the development of states, 
of knowledge, of culture, of ethnic groups indeed be adequately enough 
explained by class analysis in the sense indicated? And perhaps even 
more crucial: can the development of the capitalist mode of production 
itself be adequately enough explained in terms of class analysis? As 
I have argued elsewhere, processes of integration (state formation) 
and differentiation (class formation) are interconnected processes, 
of which it is impossible to state that the one 'causes' or 'determines' 
the other. 16 That brings us to the inadequacies of the Marxian theory 
of the state. 
3. The Marxian Theory of the State and the Ruling Class 
The development of modes of production and the formation of social 
classes are described by Marx as occuring within a society. But what 
constitutes a society? Though Marx at least programmatically takes 
the 'world market' as his unit of analysis, when analysing class 
formation or when dealing with political processes he implicitly 
regards 'society' as coinciding with the people living on a territory 
enclosed by the boundaries of ~'particular state. As 'SOCiety' is 
commonly used in social science analysis it is also implicitly 
synonymous with a state-society or 'nation'. Now if the developments 
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commonly associated with the concept 'capita~is,m"are not accompanied 
by the progressive abolition of state pounda~iesal1d the development 
of transnational political institutions ;regulating' the global network 
of capitalist relations as a whole~ but on the contrar.yby a 
continuous increase in government.'functions '(also with respect to the 
economy) and a continuous expansion of 'st~te institutions and power, 
a theory not so much of the state but of'stateiorinatiQn as an 
ongoing process bec:omes necessary. However~:the'two mos,t conspicuous 
recent attempts, those of Miliba:t:ldandPoularit~as; " to improve the 
Marxian theory of the state, stiii aim at.determining the role of 
the state in capitalist society. P Though their a:p.proache~e rather 
different, a difference which has led them into a prolonged debate, 
neither of them sees the need to. go' beyond s:Uch a static conception 
of the state, as fulfilling essentially the same functions in 
capitalist societies (Miliband) or, in thecaPitali~t mode of 
production (Poulantzas). 18 Miliband's analysis'is directed mainly 
at the attempt by American political scientists (the so-called 
'pluralists') to deny the existence of a ruling class (of capitalists) 
within capitalist state-societies. But as Balbus has argued, his own 
theoretical position corresponds more closely to C. Wright Mills' 
ruling elite theory than to a clasr:; theory of the state. 19 poulantzas 
has more ambitious aims, i.e. to apply Althuss~r's,interpretation of 
Marx to the political sphere of society; and especially to assess the 
position of the state in the capitalist mode of production, which he 
designates with the capital initials M.P.C., always the same. The 'M.P.C. 
must thus be a static 'system', and indeed Poulantias' alternative 
to Miliband is a variety of structural-functionalism' clothed in Marxist 
concepts. As Poulqntzas'argues in his critique'of Miliband: '(We should 
see) social classes and the state as objective structures, and their ' 
relations as an objective system of regular conriections a structure 
and a system whose agents, 'men', are in the,words of Marx, 'bearers' 
of it, "Trager".' He continues: 'the State is precisely the factor 
of cohesion of a social formation and the factpr of reproduction of 
the conditions of production of a system ••••••• ' In other words: 
in Poulantzas conc~ption the state is seen as fulfilling particular 
functions for the capitalist system. For Poulantzas it is then easy' 
to say that the class origin of members of the State apparatus, 
to which Miliband gives much attention, is irrelevant. The bureaucracy 
(for Poulantzasa not further defined 'social category', not a class) 
has 'as its objective function the actualisation of the role of the 
state'. For Poulantzas as for Parsons everything falls nicely into 
place. However, what is established is a relationship between concepts 
instead of relations between interdependent 'men', the human beings 
which Poulantzas appropriately places between quotation marks, seeing 
them only as 'agent!s' of functions necessary for system maintenance 
(or transformation). In his 'Pouvoir Politique et Classes Sociales', 
Poulantzas discusses the absolutist state as a 's.tate pf transition' 
between the 'feudal type of state' and the "capitalist type of state'. 20 
His types of state are of course reducible to modes of production, 
which are again theoretically defined, i.e. as ideal-types. This 
implies that he uses a system-transformation image of change instead 
of seeing change as structured process (development). 21 For these 
reasons neither Miliband nor Poulantzas have much to add to the basic 
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assumptions of the Marxian conception of the state: that it was 
created in its present form by the bourgeo'isie and that it functions 
as 'a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole 
bourgeoisie', as the Communist Manifestoe formulates it, or in 
slightly less crude terms as 'the protector of an economically and 
socially dominant class' as Miliband will have it. Poulantzas 
attempts a more sophisticated formulation to account for anomalies 
such as government policies of capitalist states going against the 
specific (short-term) interests of important sections of the 
bourgeoisie: 'the state can only serve the ruling class in so far 
as it is relatively autonomous from the diverse factions of this 
class, precisely in order to organise the hegemony of the whole of 
this class'. Girardin 'makes the relationship between state and 
ruling class even more indirect: 'the state and the superstructure 
in general maintain the cohesion of a society deeply undermined by 
the contradictions inherent from the relations of production'. 22 
But all this does not go much further than what Marx and Engels 
themselves wrote already in The German Ideology: 'Through the 
emancipation of private property from the community, the state has 
become a separate entity, beside and outside civil,society; but it 
is nothing more than the form of organisation which the bourgeoisie 
necessarily adapt both for internal and external purposes, for the 
mutual guarantee of their property and interests'. 23 Whether doing 
so in an open or more 'covert manner, the state is seen as serving 
the interests of the ruling class, at the very least by guaranteeing 
the continuing operation of the capitalist mode of production! However, 
with respect to the state in post-colonial societies Alavi, basing 
his arguments on both Miliband and Poulantzas, feels forced to amend 
this conception of the role of the state by positing that a.single 
ruling class does not exist in post-colonial societies: There ,are, 
according to him 'three propertied classes; the metropolitan 
bourgeo'isie (the indigenous bourgeoisie and the landed classes" •• 
The state - ;for Alavi identical 'with 'the military-bureaucratic 
oligarchy - 'is relatively autonomous and it mediates between the 
competing interests of the three propertied classes'. 24 
Common to all these interpretations of the precise relationship 
between the state and the ruling classy. is that 'the state is held to 
fulfil functions only for the class(es), that control the means of 
production. Common to them is also, that no clear distinction is 
made between state and government: in most cases they are treated 
as if they coincide completely. But whether the state is seen as 
'relatively autonomous' (i.e. from the ruling class) or as an 'organ 
of repression of one class by another' (Lenin), the state is analysed 
only in terms of economic interdependencies and the power resource'S 
and power chances to which these give rise within particular state-
societies. There is a peculiar blindness in most of these writings 
to what is obvious: that the state in the singular class does not 
exist, but that the existence of a state presupposes the existence 
of other states, in other words of a plurality of states. State 
formation therefore implies an ongoing process of ,inter-state 
competition, which influences the distribution of power resources 
and power chances within states. Neither in Miliband's nor in 
Poulantzas,' analysis of the capitalist state any mention is made of 
the significance ~f inter=itate competition. Only Alavi in his 
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analysis of the post-colonial state takes interdependencies across 
state-boundaries into account. This leads him to introduce the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie (the British bourgeoisie, I presume, since 
Alavi's example is Pakistan, but then what about the American 
bourgeoisie - and what about the British and the American states?) 
as a class, which for purposes of analysis he treats as being on 
the same footing as the 'indigenous bourgeoisie' and the 'landed 
class'. Because the 'bureaucratic-military oligarchy' has no direct 
control over means of production, it is not a class, but since its 
power has to be explained by reference to the 'basis', it must 
derive its power from the real ruling class{es). The only solution 
is then to give it its 'mediating' function. But Alavi does not 
stop there. He notes that the 'relative autonomy' of the state 
(the bureaucratic-military oligarchy) is also based on 'positive 
conditions which stem from the far-reaching interventions by the 
state in the economics of Post-90lonial countries, both by way. of 
a network of controls in which the vested interests of the bureaucracy 
are embedded, and a direct appropriation and disposition of a 
substantial proportion of the economic surplus. These constitute 
independent material bases of the autonomy of the bureaucratic-
military oligarchy' (my italics, vdB). In other words, the 
'bureaucratic military oligarchy' has power resources of its own: 
'a direct appropriation and disposition of a substantial proportion 
of the economic surplus'. It controls the state apparatus (bureaucracy, 
military, police) and through that tax collection (including import 
and export duties) and the distribution of tax revenues. It also 
controls inter-state relations: foreign aid and private investment 
also provide power resources for those who control the state monopolies. 
As it became clear from the previous analysis of Marx' conception 
of class, power resources - such as Mr. Peel's capital - have to be 
seen as connected with particular kinds of inter-dependencies between 
human beings. Does the concept of the 'state.' refer to a part~cular 
kind of interdependence, to particular ties between people? Alavi 
does not ask such a question, because it contradicts the Marxian 
conception of the state. Not only the role, but also the formation of 
states in that conception is seen as derivative of the development 
of capitalism. As Alavi writes: 'In Western societies we witness the 
creation of the nation-state by indigenous bourgeoisies, in the wake 
of their ascendant power, to provide a framework of law and various 
institutions which.are essential for the development of capitalist 
relations of production'. 25 Indigenous to what, we may ask. Alavi's 
thesis about the development of the nation-state is shared by other 
Marxist writers. Harry Magdoff for example writes: 'A successful 
capitalist society needs (my italics, vdB) a strong and centralised 
state to provide the conditions for unimpeded trade within a good-
sized national market'. 26 The Marxian view is phrased most succinctly 
by David Horowitz: 'Capitalism unified the nation-state'. 27 It 
probably all goes back to the Communist Manifestoe 'Independent, or 
but loosely connected, provinces with separate interests, laws, 
governments and systems of taxation, became lumped together into 
one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national 
class-interest, one frontier and one customs-tariff'. 28 .To a~l 
such explanations we can reply: how did 'societies' become 
successfully capitalist?, and: why do 'socialist' societies need a 
state? 
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But before answering these questions, we should first recognise 
that this explanation of state formation (and of the role of the 
state) serves a polemical function; it is directed against the 
conception of the state as serving the 'general interest' of all 
the people living on the state territory. Engels in The Origin of 
the Family; Property and the State, and Lenin following his 
footsteps in State and Revolution - oppose this conception by 
giving a combined interpretation of the formation and role of the 
state as being a 'product' of the development of class conflict: 
a power that in appearance stands above the social classes with 
their irreconcilable opposed interests becomes necessary to keep 
that conflict within the boundaries of 'order'. In fact, Miliband's 
The State in Capitalist Society can be read as a continuation of 
this polemic, which in our time has to be directed against the 
'pluralist' theory of the capitalist state. This theory asserts 
that 'all the active and legitimate groups in the population can 
make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of 
decision'. 29 According to Miliband the theory that a ruling class 
does not exist has 'in one form or another, come to dominate political 
science and political sociology, and for that matter political life 
itself, in all advanced capitalist countries'. 30 Balbus in this 
connection speaks of the 'false universalism' ,of the state. 31 
To criticise from a Marxian perpective the pluralist conception 
of the state as being no more than a set of institutions for 
bargaining between interest-groups, a kind of central political 
marketplace, then nearly inevitably becomes a demonstration on the 
basis of 'data', examples and illuminating stories of the power 
resources and power chances of the 'ruling' class and the way in 
which it succeeds in decisively influencing government policy. That 
selective demonstration is bound to be successful, since there can 
be little doubt that 'control over the means of production' still is 
a very important power resource. But the attempt to refute 'pluralist' 
theories, developed primarily to account for the operations of the 
American political system, does not contribute anything to the analysis 
of state formation processes. Isaac Balbus attributes Miliband's 
'inability to explain and anticipate social and political change' to 
his abandonment 'of the Marxist dialectical model of class' in favour 
of ruling elite analysis, but does not provide more arguments in 
support of the fruitfulness of the two-class model than an attempt 
to redefine the criterion of subordinate class formation as 'the 
production of alienated labour, including intellectual labour'. 
Accordingly, 'students and intellectuals could conceive~ly be 
considered an increasingly important element of the subordinate class 
of advanced capitalist societies'. 32 Balbus thus remains faithful 
to the conception of economic interdependencies as the prime mover 
of change and development. He has not been able to show that his 
model enables him 'to explain and anticipate social and political 
change' in a more satisfactory manner than Miliband. 
Alavi states that he is aware of the deficiencies of the Marxian 
analysis of the state. Many other Marxists would agree with him -
as their growing concern with the theory of the state (in their 
formulation) demonstrates. Why is it then that they seem to be unable 
to take any distance from their original model? One reason may be the 
coerciveness of the polemics in which Marxists feel forced to engage 
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themselves: Miliband's book is in fact one extended polemic. But a 
second reason is more important: to leave the conception of economic 
interdependencies as the prime mover of change, would make it 
impossible to any longer see the capitalist mode of production as 
the 'root cause' ,as the 'fundamental' explanation of all the 
social evils Marxists want to eradicate. This belief in a root 
cause, in a cause.that can be blamed for all developments in a 
'bad' direction, fulfils important orientating functions, and 
makes it relatively easy to take an uncompromising political stand. 
It also provides certainty to participants in the internecine 
struggles within the Left: he who can show his preferred strategy 
to go tb the 'root', to really address itself to the fundamental 
causes of exploitation, oppression, poverty, underdevelopment etc. 
will have a good conscience, even if he does not win the struggle. 
He can then still 'win' by forming with his comrades in arms a new 
movement or party. For Marx himself the search for a root cause was 
very important: 'It is each time the direct relation of the proprietor 
of means of production to the direct producers - a relationship, of 
which the specific form at any moment corresponds to a certain level 
of development of the manner and kind of labour and because of that 
with its social productivity - in which we find the innermost secret, 
the hidden basis of the whole social construction and therefore also 
of the political form of relations of sovereignty and dependency, 
in short of the specific form of the State at any moment'. 33 To give 
up the belief in an 'innermost secret' can be damaging for one's 
sense of orientation and political identity. And there is still 
another reason: to analyse state formation in terms of power resources 
not necessarily de~ivative of economic interdependencies and the class 
struggle implies that the process of 'class' formation does not come 
to an end with the disappearance of the capitalist bourgeoisie - as 
the development of the Soviet Union and other socialist states has 
demonstrated but too clearly. 34 To admit this, instead of regarding 
Stalinism as an 'aberration' and the present Soviet-state of 
transition, necessary until all capitalist states (and China?) will 
have disappeared, is at the same time to hurt the dream of a better 
world that will have to come into existence after the capitalistic 
structure of economic interdependencies will have disappeared. Miliband 
ends his book with a description of that dream: 'the socialist society 
they (the working class and its allies in other classes) will create, 
will not require the establishment of an all-powerful state on the 
ruins of the old. On the contrary, their 'faculty of ruling the nation' 
will, for the first time in history, enable them to bring into being 
an authentically democratic social order, a truly free society of 
self-governing men and women, in which, as Marx also puts it, the 
state will be converted from an organ superimposed upon society into 
one completely subordinated to it'. 35 But such dreams may blind us 
to the reality of the structure of development. The question that I 
have asked before: does the concept of the 'state' refer to a 
particular kind of interdependencies, to particular ties between 
people, therefore remains to be answered. 
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4. What are 'States'? 
What are 'states'? How and When did they emerge? Is it indeed the 
case that 'indigenous bourgeoisies' created the nation states, 
because they needed them? Is it sufficient to explain state 
formation as .the necessary consequence of the emergence of the 
capitalist mode of production? These questions show that the 
interpretation of state-formation is indeed related to fundamental 
tenets of the marxian paradigm: to the relation between 'basis' and 
'superstructure' and to the conception of social change or development 
based on a succession of 'modes of production'. If it can be 
demonstrated that not only the development of economic interdependencies 
is a structured process, which is the essence of Marx' theory of class 
formation, but also state formation, a cbnceptualisation in terms of 
'basis' and 'superstructure' can no longer be considered adequate. 
The demonstration that state-formation is a structured process 
has indeed been provided by Norbert Elias in his studies Ober den 
Prozess der Zivilisation (19692) and Die Hofische Gesellschaft (1969) 
and further .elaborated in a paper Processes of state Formation and 
Nation Building (1971). I will attempt to answer the question about 
the specificity of the interdependencies, to which the concept of 
the state refers, on the basis of the model which Elias has designed. 36 
Elias' analysis is primarily, though not exclusively, based on the 
formation of the French state. But though his model could be improved 
upon by further comparative studies, its limitation to the French case 
does not affect the theoretical advance of showing the structuredness 
of state-formation as a long-term process of development •. 37 Elias 
has studied. mainly the formation of dynastic states. The French 
revolution, the long-term origins of which he has also explained, 
marks the transformation of these dynastic states into nation states. 
The process of industrialisation changed the nature of 
interdependencies between social classes. Kings and aristocrats could 
in the eighteenth century still regard the people over which they 
ruled as 'subjects', as only being there to fulfil functions for them. 
But when technological skills and schooling became increasingly 
important for industrial production, reciprocity of dependence between 
social classes became greater. 38 At the same time another process 
continued: once a monopoly is established (whether the 'political' 
monopolies of violence and taxation, or the 'economic' monopolies of 
large corporations) the individual or group controlling.the monopoly 
becomes himself more and more dependent on his dependents £or the 
administration of the monopolised chances. Therefore the power of the 
dependents as a group (class) gradually increases. Because of this 
gradual reduction of the uneveness of interdependence between stronger 
and weaker social classes, ruling elites and political parties 
increasingly had to justify themselves as governing for the 'public 
interest', for all the people living within the state. We can begin 
to speak of 'nations', when the power differentials between social 
classes become smaller, when the mistance between ruler and ruled 
becomes less great, and when state monopolies are to some extent 
controlled by pnd used for the 'people'. In the eighteenth century 
the word 'nation' was still a term of opposition: used to express 
that the people were there not for the state, but the state was there 
for the 'nation'. Again, this process of nation-state (or perhaps 
better state-nation) formation has been very slow, with many ups 
and downs, and it is by no means completed. 
With the increasing strength of the working class, through 
the formation of trade unions and socialist parties, the liberal, 
laissez-faire states of the nineteenth century were transformed 
into the welfare or service states of the twentieth century. 39 
At first a three-cornered struggle takes place: the formerly 
antagonistic relation between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie 
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(the main axis of struggle up to the second half of the nineteenth 
century) is gradually transformed into antagonistic cooperation 
against the threatening increase of power of the organised working 
class. Later the working class, in the nineteenth century still 
struggling to be represented in the political system, also becomes 
more and more 'integrated' in the state. The gradual extension of 
voting rights is one of the expressions of the growing strength of 
the working class. In the process, the state apparatus becomes 
increasingly powerful and begins to perform more and more functions. 
These centralising tendencies occur even in a country like the United 
States, where the national political ideology is very much opposed to 
increasing governmental and state functions. The class struggle 
inherent in the development of capitalism, combined with the 
increasing need for central coordination in societies with a highly 
developed division of labour, continuously strengthens state power. 
The 'internationalism' of nineteenth century socialist parties was 
unable to counteract this process, as was m?st clearly demonstrated 
by the fact, that the German socialist party voted for the war 
credits in 1914. ·41 
40 
The formation of states in Western Europe as large, internally 
pacified territories, has been an important condition for the 
development of capitalism. The existence of stable monopolies of 
violence made it possible for a process of purely economic (market) 
competition to take place. If entrepreneurs would have had to maintain 
private armies to protect their factories from attempts at destruction 
by competitors and to safeguard the roads, railways and canals over 
which their products were transported, the process of industrialisation 
could hardly have proceeded - certainly not as quickly as it did. 42 
Elias has demonstrated that there is a structure, a specific 
direction, in the process of state formation, even though the 
histories of European states are very different. What Elias has started 
to explain - and what is not explained by the Marxian theory of state 
formation as being a necessary consequence of the development of 
capitalism - is why states were formed before the capitalist mode of 
production developed. He gives in particular a detailed analysis of 
what he considers not a transition period between feudalism and 
capitalism but a distinct phase, a specific configuration: court 
society or the 'absolutist' state, as it has become known in the 
historical literature. 43 That the power of the monarchs was far 
from 'absolute' but was based on a delicate triangular power balance 
has already been mentioned. The importance of such triangular power 
balances has been seen also by Engels in The Origin of the Family, 
Private Property and the State though he saw them as an exception, 
not as a common condition as Elias: 'By way of exception, however, 
periods occur in which the working classes balance each other so 
nearly that the state power, as ostensible mediator, acquires for 
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the moment, a certain degree of independence from both'. It was seen 
in more specific terms also by Marx who remarks irt The Civil War in 
France (1871) about the rise of Bonapartism in France in the nineteenth 
century that this 'was the only form of government possible at the 
time when thebou~geoisie had already lost, and the working class had 
not yet acquired, the faculty of ruling the nation'. What Marx could 
not yet see, is that neither of the two industrial classes would 
acquire the sole faculty of ruling the nation.lIn the welfare state 
the organised employers and the organised working class became the 
ruling class~ of the state in ant~gonistic cooperation with one 
another. , 
co~on to Marx and Elias models of development is that they both 
see 'as one of the indispensable ingredients of a scientific theory 
of society the fact that men may oppress and exploit men and that 
far from being unstructured accidents, social oppression and 
exploitation are structured and can be explained in connection with 
the overall development of societies' .44 Common is also that they 
see exploitation and oppr.ession, as social development in general, 
as originating in competition resulting from the scarcity of what 
people need and value in life. In that sense Elias is just as much 
a (historical and dialectical) materialist as Marx was. 45 
The difference between Elias' and Marx' model of development 
is that Elias shows that the development of the capitalist mode of 
production and of (nation) states are interconnected aspects of one 
overall process of development, bf structured changes in the nature 
and in the degree of unevenness,complexity and geographical extension 
of human interdependencies. The development of capitalism can be 
seen as the differentiation aspect and the formation of states as the 
integration aspect of that processj Both increasing differentiation 
and increasing integration provide particular groups of human beings 
with new functions and new power resources, which make them into what 
are called 'rising' groups or classes, whereas other 'declining' groups 
or classes come to lose their old functions and power resources. 46 
Both aspects of the process are therefore a source of conflicts: not 
only class conflict is a structured process, but also integration 
conflict - the latter a combination of concepts, that runs counter 
to the meaning as opposites which the terms 'integration' and 'conflict' 
have acquired in the social sciences. The development of capitalism 
and the formation of states have also in common that they are processes 
of monopolisation, that they have an immanent, coercive dynamic towards 
the concentration of power resources and chances into an ever smaller 
number of hands monopolisation. 
It may be clear that in Elias' model the conceptualisation in 
terms of 'basis' and 'superstructure' is transcended. The 'basis' are 
power resources derived from ongoing and often coercive processes of 
social differentiation (or 'division of labour'). These may be 
important, in particular periods so important that they seem to 
overshadow all other power resources as it could indeed appear during 
the 'industrial reVolution', the structure and meaning of which Marx 
attempted to conceptualise and explain. But in order to become so 
decisive, the 'superstructure' had already to be developed to a 
rather high level. Whether power resources derived from 'superstructure' 
(states or 'integrations') weigh less, are less 'basic' than power 
resources derived from the 'basis' (from social differentiation or 
I 
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'relations of production') is a question that cannot be answered 
a priori. If 'ideas' (knowledge, ideology, science) are also included 
in the 'superstructure', as Marxists do, that conceptualisation 
becomes even more confusing. Knowledge, both in its orientation and 
control functions, is interconnected both with integration processes 
(for example the development of the bureaucracy and the army; the 
development of planning methods and institutions; the development 
of national ideologies etc.) and with differentiation processes (the 
development of productive technology, management and organisation 
techniques; the development of class ideologies). Both in its 
orientation and control functions knowledge may be important a 
power resource. Governments have increasingly become conscious of 
this as the 'nationalisation' of scientific research and the 
development of propaganda and 'intelligence' techniques may 
demonstrate, not to speak of patent rights or industrial spying. 
The development of knowledge can be studied as a long~term structured 
process in the same manner as class formation or state formation. 47 
These processes are interconnected but relatively autonomous with 
respect to each other: they can be distinguished as aspects of one 
overall process of development of societies, but they can neither be 
separated from each other nor reduced to each other. Both the Marxist 
conceptualisation in terms of 'basis' and 'superstructure' and the 
division of social science into supposedly fully autonomous disciplines, 
each with their separate conceptualisations and theories, are therefore 
mistaken. The widening of the theoretical perspective on development 
processes Elias' model provides may be illustrated by examining the 
question why the industrial proletariat has not fulfilled its assigned 
system-transforming revolutionary role. Because the 'basic 
contradiction' of the capitalist mode of production has not disappeared, 
an explanation of the 'failure' of the proletariat became necessary. 
Increasing affluence and 'embourgeoisisement' of the workers, 
indoctrination in capitalist 'values' by mass media and schools have 
been advanced as explanations for the lack of proper class consciousness 
of the working class. 48 But it may be more fruitful to look into the 
consequences of the process of increasing 'socialisation' of the central 
monopolies of the state through the increasing integration of the 
working class in the state apparatus. An important symptom of this 
process is the decline of anti-mili~arism, which in the nineteenth 
century (and in countries not involved in the First World War such as 
the Nederlands up to 1939) still was an integral part of the socialist 
movement. 49 jhe working class increasingly acquired a stake in the 
existing state-societies. State policy and planning as counteracting 
the damages done by the unplanned development of capitalism, became 
the dominant creed of the social-democratic parties. And the more the 
welfare state indeed provided important benefits to the working class, 
the more its members identified with their own nation-state rather 
than with the working class in other states~As Gunnar Myrdal has said: 
'The Welfare state is nationalistic'. 50 But this process contributed 
also to increasing differentiation within the working class: ruling 
groups of working class political parties and trade unions started to 
derive new power resources and chances from the functions they were 
able to fulfil at the central, the 'state' level. They acquired some 
common interests with the ruling groups of the bourgeo~sie: at the 
state level they deal as equals with the representatives of the 
14 
bourgeoisie, while at the factory level class based inequalities in 
income and power remain very great·- though they are smaller than in 
Marx' time. State formation and the development of capitalism lead 
to contradictory processes: the replacement of the class struggle to 
the central, state level has resulted in increasing oligarchisation, 
to which the so-called 'New Left' has again responded by stressing 
both decentralisation and democratisation. It is impossible to 
explain the emergence of this new opposition movement, which in most 
European countries has now forced trade unions to shift their 
activities again to the factory level, without looking at state and 
class formation as interconnected processes. 
Elias therefore suggeits that the concept of class should be 
amended in two respects. 5 In the first place it should no longer 
be based only on the interdependencies at the factory level - as 
the coercive relationship between owners/controllers of the means of 
production and the exploited sellers of their labour power - but 
take into account that struggles between representatives of capital 
and labour occur at many integration levels and in particular at the 
highest level of integration of state society. In the second place, 
it should not only be based on the distribution of economic chances, 
as expressed by the concept of surplus-value. At issue are also 
chances to control, command and supervise others, to which I would add 
chances to be more or less autonomous in one's work, to do stimulating, 
'creative' work, etc. In order to get a better grip on these very 
complicated patterns of distribution of chances and power resources, 
he suggests that it could help to determine the number of levels of 
integration in a society in relation to the degree of differentiation 
of functions ('division of labour'). Behind this suggestion is, of 
course, that people can derive power resources both from increasing 
differentiation, from functions they fulfil with respect to 
production, distri~ution, exchange and what economists call 'services', 
and from functions they fulfil with respect to increasing integration 
(state formation), from providing 'law and order', coordination and 
planning, conducting 'international' relations, collecting and 
distributing taxes, etc. This perspective also makes it possible to 
move beyond the division in 'sectors' (or 'sub-systems') corresponding 
with existing social scientific disciplines: the 'political', the 
'economic', the 'social' and the 'cultural' sectors. 
The question whether the concept of the 'state' refers to a 
particular kind of human interdependencies remains to be answered. 
It may help to first ask the question: why is it that if people speak -
and social scientists attempt to generalise - about the society or the 
economy, they always appear to have a particular state-society in mind, 
instead of a village or town society, or indeed human society as a 
whole? Is it because those are the social units with which people 
primarily identify? But why do they identify with units having the 
characteristics of states - and what are these characteristics? Elias' 
answer is that 'states' are units, 'in which the use of physical 
violence in the relations between the members is relatively strongly 
controlled, whereas at the same time they prepare, and sometimes even 
stimulate people for the use of physical violence against all non-
members'. 52 As crucial for the formation of the dynastic states in 
Europe, Elias sees the establishment of relatively stable central 
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monopolies of violence and taxation over large territories, which 
include what Marxists call 'feudal' estates and towns, some of 
which before had the characteristics of states themselves (city-
states). What these units have in common is that they are groups of 
people which are united in order to defend their own lives and the 
survival of their own group against other groups, or to attack 
other groups together. Because it is impossible to separate the 
defense from the attack function, Elias gives them the generic name: 
attack and defense units. At different levels of social development 
these may be villages, towns, tribes, states, 'federations' of 
states - and perhaps in the future a 'world' state, but that would 
be an altogether different kind of social unit. 
In feudal attack and defense units the ruling groups were 
warriors: these derived their power resources both from the 
protective function they fulfilled and from their control over the 
means of violence: horses, armour, weapons. To perform the protective, 
'security' function for the members of a social unit, which is tied 
to donducting its external ('international') relations, gives a group 
considerable power resources within that unit. Gradually, the 
protective function was taken over by the kings, who could acquire 
mercenary armies, when they were able to increase their revenues from 
taxation in money instead of land. Increasjn'g social differentiation, 
in particular urbanisation, was a necessary condition for the ' 
defunctionalisation of the feudal warrior aristocracy. But the kings 
started to perform new fUnctions: their power was not only based on 
the attack and defense function, but also on building and protecting 
the road networks, which made safe long distance trading possible; 
on the development of legal systems, through which business could be 
guaranteed; and on standardising the value of currencies, etc. The 
higher the level of guaranteeing social differentiation, the greater 
the number of government functions became. What needs to be 'explained 
is therefore why control over the means of physical violence has not 
remained the most important power resource in highly developed state-
societies. Why are not all societies ruled by military-bureaucratic 
oligarchies? Why have 'control over the means of production', or 
'representing the organised working class' become such important 
power resources, that they begin to form the power base of governments? 
The answers have to be found in the increasing reciprocity of 
dependence both between social classes and between ruling groups 
and the ruled (if we take 'rule' as a shorthand description for the 
specific nature of 'state' interdependencies, being based on the 
changing functions of 'integrations' as related to specific figurations 
of social differentiation). 
,ihe concept of the 'state' can in its most general formulation be 
seen 'to refer to different kinds of 'integrations' corresponding to 
different patterns of social differentiation. states are therefore not 
synonymous with governments - and are not to be confused with governments. 
states are specific types of societies, corresponding to particular 
developmental phases. We can thus speak of state-societies~ The lower 
the level of social differentiation, the greater the power chances of 
those who control the means of physical violence. That is the starting-
point for the explanation of the predominant position of 'military-
bureaucratic oligarchies' in most countries of the Third World. It is 
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related to their low level of 'development' - more specifically to 
the low levels of integration and differentiation, or again: of state 
and class formation. It is also related to their position within the 
worldwide network of 'the international division of labour' and the 
competitive struggle between coalitions of states. 
The question about the specific interdependencies to which the 
concept of 'state' ref~s, has now been answered, in as far as that 
is possible, given the present state of our knowledge about long-term 
development proces·ses. 53 
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